Completando
esta relación de entradas sobre la retribución, me permito reseñar el editorial
publicado hoy en The New York Times y
titulado “Shareholders
in Europe Demand Control”. El desencadenante de este comentario lo
constituyen las distintas iniciativas adoptadas en Europa en este asunto y el limitado
impacto que, en comparación, el problema retributivo ha tenido en el
ordenamiento americano.
Reprocha
el comentario editorial la tardanza de incorporar algunas medidas legislativas relevantes:
“While American laws do not require the level of control imposed by
some European nations, the Securities and Exchange Commission has been too
slow in carrying out the shareholder protections that are on the books. In the
United States, shareholder votes on executive pay are nonbinding. That’s better
than having no say at all, which was the case before the rules were changed in
2011 under the Dodd-Frank law. But a nonbinding vote still regards
shareholders as advisers, rather than owners. And the S.E.C. has not yet
proposed rules to implement a Dodd-Frank provision that requires companies to
calculate and disclose the ratio of a chief executive’s compensation to the
company’s median pay package. That data is crucial to gauging whether
executive pay is excessive and how pay disparities affect company performance
and the economy”.
Al
propio tiempo, con relación al sector bancario se lamenta el influyente diario
de medidas que considera erróneas en esta materia:
“This week, in a pre-emptive strike against rules that have not yet been
written, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama, the ranking Republican on
the Banking Committee, introduced a bill that would weaken the executive pay
disclosures required by Dodd-Frank. That would be exactly the wrong way to go”.
Madrid, 8 de marzo de 2013
