El pasado 25 de abril publiqué una entrada haciéndome eco de la presentación por la Comisión Europea de su Libro Verde sobre gobierno corporativo. Un documento que además se sometió a consulta pública con respecto a un cuestionario, que podía completarse hasta el día 22 de julio pasado. Algunas de las respuestas recibidas deben destacarse por la relevancia de sus remitentes o por su contenido. Es lo que sucede con la respuesta que dio el Consejo Europeo de Colegios de Abogados el pasado 24 de junio de 2011.
Tras el habitual párrafo que celebra la iniciativa de la Comisión Europea, el documento contiene una serie de indicaciones generales seguidas de las respuestas concretas a cada una de las cuestiones planteadas. Me limitaré aquí a destacar en primer lugar los comentarios que se hacen con respecto al “derecho a la apatía o a la pasividad” del accionista:
“However, the CCBE would like to point out that the involvement of shareholders in corporate social life should be a discretionary choice, and not an obligation. It is important that if investors wish to remain as passive shareholders they should not be obliged to take an active part in decision making. In this context, the CCBE has reservations about the Commission’s opinion that 'the corporate governance framework is based on the assumption that shareholders engage with companies and hold the management to account for its performance. However, there is evidence that the majority of shareholders are passive and are often only focused on short-term profits.' This assumption should at least be qualified, as a distinction should be made between minority shareholders (who may not wish to engage) and institutional investors. It is essential that there be equality of information for all shareholders - whether passive or active - so that they may make informed decisions without assuming the burden of “active participation” in the life of the company”.
En segundo lugar, el Consejo llama la atención sobre el hecho de que en el Libro Verde se abordan no pocas materias que han sido tratadas de manera habitual de forma normativa y no sometiendo su régimen a la autorregulación propia de los códigos de buen gobierno. Se cita en concreto el caso de los gestores activos o de los asesores en materia de representación:
“The CCBE also notes that some issues covered by the Green Paper such as the role of asset managers or proxy advisors, as interesting as they may be, fall more into the scope of regulation than corporate governance itself. These issues cause confusion between corporate governance of the company in which investments are made and corporate governance relating to shareholders”.
Por último, el Consejo señala lo que en su opinión falta en el documento preparado por la Comisión:
“In conclusion, the CCBE regrets that, although very much related to corporate governance, a number of issues have not been dealt with by the Commission, such as:
- The scope of authority of the Board of Directors: Should the Board, in order to fully guarantee its monitoring role have the discretionary power to summon members of the management to explain certain elements of their conduct?
- Preventing conflicts of interests within the Board: Should measures be taken to prevent for example, certain third parties having business relations with a company - suppliers, bankers, etc. - from serving on Boards of Directors?
- Directors' responsibilities: Should responsibility be collective or individual? Should a director be under a duty of care and clearly express his or her disagreement in case of a conflict with other Board members?”.
Madrid, 6 de septiembre de 2011
